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Who Owns the Future? Reflections on Patenting, Private Value Accrual 
and Societal Disbenefit in the Context of Biofuel Technology Transfer 
Paul Upham* 
Centre for Integrated Energy Research and Sustainability Research Institute, University of Leeds, UK 
Abstract: Investment in new energy technologies is inadequate relative to the timescale on which 
greenhouse emissions need to be reduced. This raises questions concerning the policy instruments 
intended to facilitate the spread of lower carbon energy supply technologies. This paper theorises the 
role of patent practices and relationships between firms of different size and power, drawing on what 
little evidence is available in relation to biofuels. We bring firm-level theory of value creation together 
with a critical perspective of selected innovation theory, to discuss the ways in which patents may be 
used such that the consequences are contrary to the public good. Considering the implications for 
clean energy technology transfer, particularly the case of biofuel technology, we conclude that while 
there is relatively little information on the ways in which patents may hinder clean energy technology transfer, there are 
certainly sufficient grounds for concern. 
Keywords: Biofuels, intellectual property, patent strategy, innovation, value creation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 This paper discusses the role of patenting in innovation, 
technology change and our associated ability as a species to 
avoid environmental collapse [1]. It sets the context for 
subsequent empirical work and relates to on-going trends in 
the roles of knowledge and value in market economies [2]. 
Specifically, we relate a theory of firm-level value creation 
to alternative patent strategies and policy debates relating to 
the need for technological change for climate change 
mitigation, particularly renewable energy. Our underlying 
premise is that global financial, economic and environmental 
crises require different ways of thinking, different ways of 
acting and different ways of doing capitalism. In particular, 
in terms of the environmental impact of contemporary 
economic systems, the prospect of a number of 
discontinuous, large scale, interconnected environmental and 
climatic changes this century demands a rapid shift towards 
more sustainable practices [3]. Deploying new, low carbon 
energy technologies internationally is one of the more 
important of these shifts [4]. 
 Patenting is already playing a role in clean technology 
development; at issue is the nature of that role, the 
implications for the rate at which new technologies are 
adopted and hence the implications for the future state of the 
planet. While technology is only one factor that will shape 
this future, it is nonetheless an important one. The number of 
international patent applications filed in the EU relating to 
climate change mitigation technology, relative to GDP, more 
than doubled between 2000 and 2007 [5]. While this is 
viewed positively at policy levels, policy influence over 
incumbent energy firms and supply cartels, particularly in  
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terms of encouraging new entrants and renewable energy 
technology innovation, is far from straightforward. Indeed 
one of the main challenges is the need to co-ordinate the 
phase-in of low carbon sources with the phase out of so-
called ‘brown’ sources [6]. The scale of the required 
deployment of low carbon energy technology is huge, but the 
level of contemporary investment in particularly renewable 
energy technology by the incumbents is modest: contrast, for 
example, BP’s $8bn investment in low carbon energy 
technology1 over 2005-15 with its single year operating 
revenue in 2010 of $267bn, or its $20bn compensation fund 
for the Deepwater Horizon oil leak [7, 8]. 
 It is known that patents are used strategically to block 
competitors [9-11]; that some of this activity can be regarded 
as aggressive - including by so-called patent ‘trolls’ [12] - 
and that the social cost of not using a patent increases in 
proportion to its scope [11]. Somewhat conversely, it is also 
known that there is a strong temporal aspect to the societal 
value of patents: a need to balance the benefits to first and 
subsequent generations of developers [13]. Acquiring 
knowledge that is not used at one point in time may have the 
function of blocking others’ actions, but it also enables a 
firm to be ready for its future use, when an opportunity 
presents itself or, a specific likelihood in the clean energy 
sector, the policy environment becomes more consistently 
and vigorously supportive. 
 Overall, perceptions of the value to society of different 
levels of stringency for patent law have fluctuated over the 
years [14]. A common narrative, though, is one in which the 
small firm or inventor battles against a large company in 
defence of his or her intellectual contribution [15]. While the 
reality is more complex, the role of patents is mediated by a 
range of contextual factors including the interactions of 
small and large firms, the latter often multinationals, as we 
discuss below. A key aspect of this interaction is what we 
term as ‘value hoarding’, challenging the assumption that 
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there is necessarily a positive association between 
innovation, patent filing and societal benefit in terms of a 
benign shaping of the future. Drawing on Schumpeter’s 
principles of Creative Accumulation and Creative 
Destruction in conjunction with Bruyat’s [16, 17] and Bruyat 
and Julien’s [18] theory of new value creation through 
entrepreneurship, we describe a theoretical basis for 
corporate strategies of value accrual based through patenting. 
We then consider the implications of this for clean energy 
technology transfer, including the particular case of biofuel 
technology. We are very well aware of the (often rightly) 
contested nature of biofuel technology and of the advantages 
and disadvantages of different feedstock and conversion 
technology types, combinations, conditions and scales of 
production. We take biofuels as a case principally because it 
is one of the very few cases where previous work exists in 
relation to the connections between patenting, national and 
international IPR policy and corporate strategy. Although 
others [16, 19] have examined firm size in relation to patent 
litigation, and although there have been major surveys of 
corporate use and non-use of patents [11], defensive and 
offensive patent practices seem to be untheorised in terms of 
value creation and related studies in the clean energy sector 
are scant. 
 There are also further reasons for focusing on the 
relationship of smaller and larger firms when considering the 
role of patents in both facilitating and hindering 
technological change. Firstly smaller firms have been 
repeatedly shown to be in many ways more successful 
sources of innovation, highly personalised in their values 
provision and more often pioneers of radical innovations 
than their larger counterparts [20, 21]. Small firms have also 
been credited with making a fundamental contribution to 
local, regional and national economies due to their net 
contribution to employment and job creation [22], taking 
over a social role as recipients for labour released due to 
rationalisation, scaling down and decentralisation amongst 
larger businesses, management buy-outs, and the 
introduction of new technologies [23]. Thus while we could 
have restricted our discussion to IPRs held by firms of 
unspecified size, organisational size does seem to be an 
important variable (albeit but one among many) in both 
innovation and in realising societal benefit in addition to 
private benefit from technological innovation. 
 Secondly, in so far as IPRs play a critical role as a 
mediator of societal value, so they often also figure highly in 
the relationships between smaller and larger firms. 
Fundamentally, IPRs mediate the realisation of value 
through the allocation of ownership. Yet the relationship of 
small and large firms, particularly multinationals in 
innovation generally, and in relation to IPRs specifically, is 
ambiguous [22]. McDonald [24] expresses it thus in relation 
to one particular sector: “the patent system is not equally 
suited to all; it suits the pharmaceutical industry very well 
indeed, and most small firms (SMEs) very badly”. Similarly, 
critical voices [24, 25] have suggested that MNC purchasing 
power, dominant market positions and socio-economic, 
political and technological dominance exert a variety of 
pressures on stakeholders, particularly SMEs operating in 
globalized commodity markets. 
2. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
 We take developing country technology transfer for 
greenhouse gas emissions mitigation as a strong case of 
societal value creation. IPR in the pharmaceutical sector, 
specifically generic drug production, might be a similar case. 
While related arguments would apply to patent strategy in, 
for example, the consumer electronics sector, the societal 
benefits potentially foregone might be more debateable. 
With this rationale in mind, the paper is structured as 
follows: first we review selected aspects of the small-large 
firm relationship and discuss the Schumpeterian concepts of 
Creative Destruction (CD) and Creative Accumulation (CA) 
and their relevance to innovation, Schumpeter being perhaps 
most classically and reverently associated with the field of 
technology innovation. We then critically investigate 
conceptions of value creation, proposing a model based on 
conceptualisations of entrepreneurship as value creation [17, 
18]. The latter follows a four variable model of the 
entrepreneur, the organisation, the process of firm creation 
and his/her interactions with the environment, enabling a 
complete picture of the firm’s development. Thereafter, we 
review ways in which patents may be used strategically to 
secure value within the firm in ways that limit wider societal 
benefit, particularly in relation to international technology 
transfer. Through this process, we identify themes arising 
from the discussion, which we then consider in relation to 
the transfer of biofuel technology to developing countries. 
Given the paucity of data available, the paper inevitably 
reflects the authors’ views as much as an empirical base. 
3. DISCUSSION 
3.1. Innovation and Small-Large Firm Relationships 
 As Schumpeter observed [26, 27], clustered MNCs share 
certain elements of collective capitalism. They invest heavily 
in global R&D and marketing, but they also represent power 
in markets and politics. These resources are concentrated 
geographically: by the 1980s, over 80% of all R&D 
expenditure occurred in five countries: the US, Japan, 
France, the UK and Germany [28, 29]. This is, however, a 
highly dynamic and competitive context: on the current 
trends, China is set to overtake the EU by 2014 in terms of 
absolute R&D expenditure [5]. While EU total research 
investment rose by 50% between 1995 and 2008, in China it 
rose by 855% [5]. 
 Despite on-going shifts in the global economic power 
balance, the firms involved collectively influence (if not 
determine) the rules of the game in the global economy [25]. 
In economic terms, it is only growth firms and successful 
start-ups that pose countervailing power [25]. Whether or not 
such firms are in general more innovative than larger 
incumbents is unclear. One estimate from the mid-1980s 
suggests that small firms produce some four times as many 
innovations per R&D dollar as middle-sized firms and 24 
times as many large firms [30]. However a more recent 
estimate [31], integrating empirical studies of the 
associations of firm size and market competition with 
product and process innovations, did not find evidence of 
substantial differences in the strength of the influence of 
either firm size or competition on the two innovation types. 
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 Indeed the relationship between entrepreneurial small 
firms and multinationals is full of such contradictions: 
relationships between the two are often perceived as 
marriages of convenience, often (but of course not always) 
with smaller firms owning technology of interest to larger 
firms [2]. Nonetheless, in general, larger companies need 
new products to keep their marketing portfolio full and 
acquisition of small firms or rights to their innovations offers 
one way of meeting this need. Aware of this, small firms 
tend to pursue their own agendas in their dealings with their 
larger counterparts, aiming to give as little as possible and to 
build their own in-house skills whilst working with large 
firms [32]. The small firm strategy is often to sell marketing 
rights and entertain different contracts with large firms, thus 
ensuring independence and flexibility [32]. Large companies 
can be useful partners for entrepreneurs, as the former have 
access to world-class technologies [33, 34], as well as 
relatively efficient marketing channels and logistics with a 
global reach. 
 Given the above ambiguities in the relationship between 
innovation and firms of radically different size, a return to 
theory is merited when thinking about the relationship 
between value creation, firm size and societal benefit. Below 
we revisit classical Schumpeterian concepts and later 
theoretical developments, setting the scene for what we see 
as a more contemporary and perhaps less stylized account of 
the dynamics involved. 
3.2. Creative Destruction and Creative Accumulation 
Revisited 
 Schumpeter advocated two approaches to the innovative 
process: Creative Destruction (CD) and Creative 
Accumulation (CA). The first focuses on the role of new 
entrepreneurs entering market niches, introducing new ideas 
and challenging existing firms through a process of Creative 
Destruction (Prozess der kreativen Zerstörung), considered 
the engine of economic progress [35]. CD can ex post be 
observed as economic discontinuity, which then becomes the 
entrepreneurial momentum ex ante to introduce innovations 
and to earn monopoly profits, on condition that an 
entrepreneur is early enough in identifying market 
opportunities [25]. 
 Nelson and Winter [36] further developed Schumpeterian 
ideas into Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II 
technological regimes. Mark I focuses on the key role of new 
firms in innovative activities, i.e. CD; Mark II focuses on the 
role played by large and established firms, i.e. CA. CD is 
understood as a micro-economic process in nature, with 
important macro-economic implications [37]. In particular, 
small, new, innovative firms, highly personalised in their 
values provision, are classically viewed as a key source of 
innovations [20]. 
 In terms of Schumpeter’s theoretical developments [38], 
CA came later (1942) and related to the role of large firms as 
engines for economic growth via the accumulation of non-
transferable knowledge in specific technological areas and 
markets [39]. The idea is that in large firms there is a strong 
positive feedback loop from successful innovation to 
increased R&D capability and activity, setting up a feedback 
loop that in turn reinforces market concentration [40]. 
 CA is thus associated with a number of processes of 
institutionalised innovation by large firms [41]. When 
entrepreneurs engaged in processes of CD expose their 
innovations to the market, large firms may legally 
appropriate a major part of that intellectual property and add 
to their own proprietary knowledge stock. This is assisted by 
the use of near-monopoly power, substantial in-house R&D 
departments and networks of partners such as research 
universities and private and public research institutes [41]. 
Internal and financial resources allow the larger firms to 
recruit the competencies required to embed externally 
developed generic knowledge into the development of new 
products and services internally [41]. Moreover, utilising 
scale economies and monopoly power, large firms are able to 
create high barriers to entry of new entrants [42], impact 
upon industry life cycles and market structure [43]. 
 Both concepts - CD and CA are thus the opposite ends of 
a continuum [41]. Fig. (1) provides a stylised, Schumpeterian 
approach to value creation as being a function of CD and 
CA, in relation to innovation and IPR, specifically patenting. 
Both the processes of CA and CD are thus conceived of as 
being socially beneficial. 
3.3. Schumpeterian Logic and Bruyat’s Theory of Value 
Creation 
 This brief rehearsal of one aspect of Schumpeterian 
thought provides a context for considering the process of 
value creation, for which purpose we use a perspective 
provided by Bruyat & Julien [16, 18], defining 
entrepreneurship as concerning the relationship between the 
individual and value creation (“l’objet scientifique étudié 
dans le champ de l’entrepreneruship est la dialogique 
individu/creation de valeur”) [16]. Bruyat’s concept is in turn 
based on Gartner’s four-variable model for entrepreneurship 
[42], comprising the individual, the process, the environment 
and the enterprise. This approach suggests that new value is 
created in terms of more or less intense change in the 
environment directly related to the entrepreneurial process 
[44]. In other words, at the heart of the entrepreneurial 
process we find the act of value creation, as a result of the 
interaction between the individual and his/her environment. 
At the beginning of the process we have: 
 The Individual (I) => New value creation (NVC) [18] 
where the individual defines himself or herself in relation to 
the structure, i.e. the organisation that is being created. 
Hence the individual is both constrained and created by the 
object that (s)he constructs. From this it can be concluded 
that: 
 The Individual (I) ó New value creation (NVC) [18] 
indicating the dialogic between the two entities who form a 
system. Following general systems theory [44], the 
entrepreneurial system can be considered a type 9 system, 
meaning that it is capable of learning and creating and that it 
has intention [18]. The system as such is also open and 
interacts with its own environment, as shown in Fig. (2). 
Similar to Gartner’s conception [42], this model is comprised 
of four key aspects: the individual, the object created (i.e. the 
organisation and/or an innovation), the environment and the 
process (Fig. 2). 
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Fig. (2). The entrepreneurial process located within its environment 
and time (after Bruyat & Julien, 2001). 
 Taking this initial model further, we propose a theoretical 
understanding for the relationship between the entrepreneurial 
individual (I) involved in new value creation (NVC) which 
leads through a process of CD to (radical) innovation. 
However, this process, which is potentially favourable for 
society, can be impeded by the process of CA, as the act of 
value creation takes place not in a vacuum but in a particular 
context or environment involving, in practice, agents such as 
MNCs, government subsidies, university and other research 
laboratories and a wide range of stakeholders who seek to 
influence the system in their interests, as shown in Fig. (3). In 
this respect our conception of value creation through 
innovation corresponds with those who argue that CD and CA 
are not exclusive, but rather interrelated processes [41]. 
 
Fig. (3). The relationship between value creation, CD and DA in 
the context of stakeholder influences. 
 
 
3.4. Critical Views of Patenting 
 Thus far, we have extended the classical account of 
innovation by bringing this together with an account of value 
creation processes that emphasises the complexity of the 
relationships of firms and their environments. In this section 
we add to this account of complexity by introducing what 
might be termed the ‘critical’ literature on patent strategy. 
By ‘critical’ is here meant work that questions the 
relationship between patenting, innovation, societal welfare 
and social change, be this conceptually or empirically. 
 As with technological innovation generally, there 
remains a widespread assumption that patenting is a socially 
positive activity. Yet patenting primarily has private value. 
Moreover, use of patenting as a competitive, strategic tool, 
rather than simply a defensive one, has a long history. For 
example, a cyclical salience to technological innovation in 
US anti-trust law over the period 1890-2000 has been 
observed [45], as well as Woodrow Wilson’s critique in 
1912 of the practice of purchasing patents that then remain 
unused. More recently is the question of whether IPR 
mechanisms have any positive relationship at all to 
innovation - and perhaps a negative relationship - suggesting 
that factors such as the technological paradigm and firm 
characteristics and capabilities have more of a bearing on 
innovation rates [46]. 
 While the patent is nominally supposed to be a means to 
the end of protecting IPR, it has become much more than 
this, arguably since the 1982 inauguration of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in the United States, 
a specialist patent court, in authority just below the Supreme 
Court [47]. From this perspective the patent has become an 
end in itself, with strategic value independent of innovation, 
supported by a technology-push myth of a linear innovation 
process in which R&D is at a chronologically early point in 
the chain, rather than the more complex, contemporary 
actuality. Moreover small firms and developing countries 
have had little power in the development of the global patent 
system [47]. 
 Examining patent behaviour in more detail, we can 
distinguish two strategic approaches to the use of patents by  
 
 
 
Fig. (1). A stylised, Schumpeterian approach to value creation as being a function of Creative Destruction (CD) and Creative Accumulation 
(CA). 
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German companies, namely offensive and defensive 
patenting. Offensive patenting pertains when a firm is 
already earning a return from an innovation, which it later 
patents in order to hinder or block another firm planning to 
patent a similar but not identical innovation [48, 49]. In 
comparison, defensive patenting pertains when a firm patents 
its innovation to prevent another firm patenting that same 
innovation, even though it has not needed the patent, up to 
that point, in order to earn a return [48, 49]. 
 Offensive patenting may involve building a web of 
patents that are not used directly for IPR purposes, but which 
serve to protect another patent [48, 49]. Such blocking of 
others’ attempts to patent and/or sell their own, closely 
related products [50], by patenting around a product, is also 
referred to as creating a patent thicket, cluster or bracket 
[51]. Associated activities have been termed blitzkrieging, 
consolidation, blanketing and flooding, fencing and 
surrounding, by patent harvesting and ramping up [52, 24]. 
A qualitatively different strategy is patent stacking [53]. 
Patent stacking in combination with reach-through license 
agreements (RTLAs) may extend the influence of a patent 
holder onwards through time, in relation to subsequent 
innovations in which they are not directly involved. An 
RTLA gives a patent holder rights (e.g. to a royalty) in 
subsequent downstream discoveries, often in lieu of an 
upfront payment to use the patented innovation. Through 
multiple patenting around an innovation, rather than of the 
specific innovation only, there is a higher chance of retaining 
rights to a return. 
3.5. Value Creation and SME-MNC Inter-Relationships 
 In the light of the above, in this section we consider the 
relationship between larger and smaller firms, specifically 
processes of value creation and the role of patenting therein. 
Arguably, CA is associated with institutionalised innovation 
by large firms which appropriate the intellectual property of 
individual entrepreneurs and protect it as a major part of 
their own intellectual property. However, the ways in which 
innovation processes are perceived by industrialised societies 
has changed over time [40]. Innovation has come to be less 
understood as the capability to innovate and more as the 
ability to discover new technological principles in terms of 
the systematic exploitation of “the effects produced by new 
combinations and use of pieces in the existing stock of 
knowledge” [40]. This new understanding requires 
systematic access to the state-of-the-art and new procedures 
for disseminating information about the stock of 
technologies available, so that knowledge and information 
exchange between innovators is made possible [40]. 
 Technological knowledge is generally embedded in some 
form of specific blueprint form such as a patent, artefact, a 
design, a software programme, a manuscript or composition 
[39]. By design, this knowledge is often not fully shared and 
the concentration of patents in the ownership of a few 
countries and a few MNCs in particular locations is 
potentially antithetical to the process of sharing that 
knowledge with the many. Knowledge and innovative 
activity are geographically clustered [54] and the tendency 
toward spatial concentration has become more marked over 
time [55]. Yet the capacity of an economy to benefit from 
technical change and innovation is finally “dependent on the 
dynamic efficiency with which firms and institutions can 
diffuse, adapt, and apply information and knowledge” [40]. 
The diffusion of such knowledge is key to growth [40]. Once 
the contribution of an innovation is manifest as leading-edge 
technology, other firms are able to deploy that technology 
through purchase of related but different design and 
incumbent firms whose technology is no longer on the 
leading edge experience competition, i.e. the process of CD 
is in place. 
 Whereas knowledge can - theoretically - be shared freely, 
there are costs associated when acquiring knowledge [56]. 
The cost for filing a patent in two countries amounts to 
$16,971, 7 countries $59,397 and 15 countries $119, 381; 
these figures include official feeds, maintenance, legal and 
translation costs [57]. The costs highlight the importance of 
economies of scale when patenting, but also the need for 
adequate financial resources when engaging on this path. It 
can be assumed that MNCs, with larger resources than small 
firms, will have less trouble funding patenting than young, 
struggling ventures. Hence processes of CA and IPR accrual 
may accentuate the imbalance of access to financial 
resources of small and large firms, creating significant 
barriers to entry for small businesses, so impacting new 
value creation potentially beneficial for society. 
 Through the process of CA, the production of knowledge 
becomes the privileged domain of the “comfortable world” 
of standard models [58], with stakeholders such as R&D 
laboratories and universities specialising in knowledge 
production and in particular generic knowledge with 
potential for large-scale commercialisation processes [41]. 
This contrasts with CD which supports the key role of small 
business in providing impetus for change, innovation, 
personalised value propositions and specific knowledge [59]. 
 Knowledge is the core of the global economy [25] and as 
such “knowledge represents the capabilities of individuals or 
social groups associated with meaning and understanding, as 
well as the abilities to organise, interpret and assess 
information while information is knowledge reduced to 
messages that can be transmitted to decision agents” [60]. 
Knowledge is concentrated in the hands of a few 
multinationals in a limited number of locations and is 
associated with established power dynamics. Hence US 
policy-maker concern regarding the relationship of economic 
strength to maintain national security and military might [24, 
47]. In particular in the 1980s, high technology and 
associated patents were considered as key to keeping 
American technology American. The pharmaceutical 
industry was quick to use this opportunity to establish a 
monopoly, rather than the diffusion of information that may 
have benefited foreign companies and thus jeopardised US 
innovation, competitiveness and security [47, 61]. As 
Macdonald observes: “some companies now have no activity 
beyond collecting patents in the hope of obstructing the 
innovation of other companies” [47]. 
 MNCs collaborate with the most successful universities 
and research laboratories to access the latest technology and 
knowledge [62]. Yet the increased propensity of universities 
to patent inventions has reduced spill-overs from research, as 
universities now benefit more directly from in-house 
innovation [63]. Increasingly, universities forge formal and 
informal ties with companies, yet to date the focus has been 
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on large firm relationships. US universities are particularly 
successful in filing patents (see for instance California 
University with 364 patent filings in 2007, followed by MIT 
with 175 filings, Columbia with 114 and Texas System with 
95 filings [57]. In 5th position we find Osaka University with 
91 filings and Tokyo University with 67 filings in 10th 
position (ibid). The same data as of 2007 reveals the 
complete absence of European universities. 
 The European Commission has found that many service 
sector innovations do not necessarily meet the requirements 
for protection through patenting, that twice as many 
industrial as service firms applied for a patent and that more 
industrial than service firms apply for a trademark [58]. One 
reason for this may be the mismatch between the type of 
knowledge generated by universities and research institutes 
and the knowledge needed by the services sector. Such 
knowledge can only exceptionally be synthesized and 
transferred in a codified manner, something that is easier for 
technological knowledge [58]. As a result, the EC called for 
a complete rethink of European innovation policy in line 
with the changing socio-economic, political, technological 
and environmental circumstances, with particular focus on 
innovation in services, seen as a main enabler for the 
creation of the knowledge-based economy and hence a 
priority for Europe [58]. Disruptive innovation helps firms 
and economies grow through the creation of new business 
and the development of new product markets, i.e. in 
Schumpeterian terms ‘new economic space’ [59]. Arguably, 
small firms’ innovative capacity, also for disruptive 
innovation, enables them to create ‘uncontested market 
space’ [59]. 
 In the remainder of the paper we discuss issues arising 
from the above in relation to a specific example of the use of 
IPR for societal benefit, namely technology transfer in the 
clean energy sector, using biofuels as a specific case. We 
note how little study there has been on the role of the 
acquisition of patents for blocking purposes in the clean 
energy sector. 
3.6. Technology Transfer and IPR 
 Enhancing technology transfer to developing countries 
has been an integral part of the global climate change regime 
since the inception of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), yet the role of 
IPRs has emerged as a particularly contentious issue in this 
context [64]. Many developing countries and some 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) have advocated the 
use and expansion of the flexibilities on IP available within 
the WTO TRIPS Agreement, such as compulsory licensing, 
while many developed countries and business associations 
claim that only strengthened IP regimes will encourage the 
necessary innovation, transfer and diffusion of such 
technologies [65]. 
 In 2010, with the purpose of mapping the clean 
technology patent landscape, the European Patent Office 
(EPO) reviewed 60 million patent documents and identified 
400,000 that matched one or more of 50 clean energy 
technology categories. The EPO also elicited 160 responses 
organisations regarding their IP licensing behaviour 
(constituted of 47% MNCs; 7% large firms; SMEs with 
fewer than ten employees constituted 24% of the private 
company respondents; others 34%). Respondents with 
headquarters in Germany, the US, Japan, France and the UK 
amounted to 74 per cent of the total respondents and 63% of 
respondents focused on biomass/biofuels [65]. The study 
found that the leading six countries with actors innovating 
and patenting CETs are Japan, the United States, Germany, 
the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and France. 
Aside from geothermal, national (geographic) concentration 
in all CETs is relatively high: the top six countries account 
for almost 80% of all patent applications in the CETs 
reviewed. 
 Views on IPR posing barriers to technology transfer are 
mixed and it is clear that IPRs are only one factor in a 
complex situation [66]; with the capacity to assimilate, 
implement and develop a technology also being important. 
Hence an examination of companies developing solar 
photovoltaic (solar PV), biofuel and wind technologies in 
Brazil, India and China concluded that IPRs are unlikely to 
be a significant barrier to access in the immediate future 
[65]. Similarly most patents for CETs are not filed in least 
developed countries (LDCs) in any case, given their small 
market potential [67]. This would leave companies in those 
countries free to use others’ inventions. On the other hand, 
while the overall effect of strong patent protection on the 
transfer of technology is not clear, as demand for new energy 
technologies strengthens in response to climate change 
policy, corporate action may frustrate technology transfer 
through the refusal to license and the use of other kinds of 
restrictive business practices [68]. In this regard, based on 
company case studies in India involved in CETs, gaining 
ownership of or access to IP may be a necessary but not 
sufficient requirement for successful low-carbon technology 
transfer [69]. Moreover IPRs seem to be slowing down the 
rate at which Indian firms are able to develop commercial 
hybrid vehicle technologies without infringing existing 
international patents owned by industry leaders such as 
Toyota and General Motors [70]. 
3.7. Studies of Blocking Patents 
 The PatVal-EU survey [11, 71] assessed the prevalence 
of non-use of patents, licensing and use of patents to block 
potential competitors. The results of the survey, conducted 
between 2003 and 2004, and which collected information on 
9,216 patents filed between 1993 and 1997 in six European 
countries, are closely relevant to the thesis of value hoarding. 
Overall, 18.7% of patents were filed primarily to block other 
companies. 17.4% of patents were unused but were 
considered to be ‘sleeping’ rather than blocking [11, 71]. In 
large firms, 21.7% of patents were reported as being filed to 
actively block rival R&D and 19.1% were considered 
sleeping (not having the effect of blocking). Medium size 
firms developed a relatively high percentage of patents for 
internal use (65.6%) and had less than half the percentage of 
strategically held or sleeping patents as large firms. Smaller 
firms reported a very low incidence of unused patents (9.6% 
were blocking patents and 8.8 % were sleeping) [72]. 
 This indicates the arguably more socially positive 
character of SME use of IPR, in terms of value hoarding, 
reflecting not altruism, but the way in which SMEs are under 
financial pressure to use the knowledge acquired inside the 
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firm for new value adding activities. It also indicates a need 
for European policy makers to provide more support 
(including advice and finance) to small to medium-sized 
enterprises, to help them develop and acquire IPR for new 
value adding activities. This is particularly so in Europe: an 
American SME is twice as likely as a European SME to have 
a high share of its patent portfolio licensed [72]. 
 There are studies using international databases and 
surveys that capture some aspects of inventor and patent 
mobility: e.g. Japan and the US [73]; the Australian Inventor 
Survey [74]; the European PatVal survey [11, 72]. However 
details such as the use of patents to block other firms were 
beyond the remits of these studies and it is debatable whether 
such data could be accurately elicited through survey or 
interview methods. It is this blocking activity that needs 
closer examination and for this purpose it is the movement of 
patents that must be observed. It is our intention that the 
theoretical basis that we have laid here will assist in 
empirical investigation of value creation chains, particularly 
the movement of intellectual value between firms, including 
internationally. 
3.8. The Case of Biofuel Patenting 
 While studies of biofuel patenting specifically are very 
limited in number [75], the number of biofuel-related patents 
has increased substantially in recent years. Using the US as 
an example, between 2002-2007, 2,796 biofuel-related 
patents were published, with an increase of 610 per cent 
from 2002 to 2007 [75]. In 2007, the number of biofuel 
patents exceeded the combined total of solar power and wind 
power patents published [75]. Categorized by ownership 
entity, the patents published in selected technologies in 
2006-2007 were 57 per cent owned by corporate entities, 11 
per cent owned by universities or other academic institutions 
and 32 per cent undesignated [75, 76]. 
 A substantial number of start-up biofuel companies (by 
definition small businesses) are offering novel biofuel 
technologies [77]. If any of these technologies become a 
definitive choice for a particular process, the company 
controlling that technology may secure greater control of the 
market and extend that control to other links in the 
commodity chain [78]. There are precedents for this in the 
related sector of agribusiness: a small group of multinational 
US agribusinesses has achieved oligopolistic control of 
commodity value chains through the strategies of horizontal 
and vertical integration [78, 79]. More generally, as Table 1 
illustrates, biofuel technology is an area exhibiting a 
relatively high incidence of patent disputes relative to other 
clean energy options [80]. 
 In the agribusiness sector, value is particularly accrued 
by obliging annual purchase by farmers of seed and/or agro-
chemicals, to maintain yields. Two companies, DuPont-
Pioneer and Monsanto, account for 56% of the U.S. seed 
corn market and four companies account for 29% of the 
world market in commercial seeds [81, 82]. Comparing the 
biofuel and agribusiness sectors, the biofuels industry has the 
potential to follow the trajectory of the agricultural 
biotechnology industry, with its divestitures, mergers and 
acquisitions leading to consolidation globally [75]. Indeed a 
restrictive IPR regime for advanced biofuel technology has 
been judged by some as likely to prevail, to the detriment of 
developing countries due to the technology being costly to 
obtain and difficult (inter alia) to adapt to local needs [75]. 
 More generally, key issues of concern in this context 
include control of access to resources and imbalances in 
intellectual property right regimes across countries [75]. This 
Table 1. Illustrative cases of recent biofuel patent infringement disputes. 
 
Case Company Descriptions Year Focus of Dispute 
Gevo vs Butamax: on-
going as of early 2013 
Both are small to medium sized US employers with 
major financial backing: Gevo by e.g. Total and 
Richard Branson; Butamax by BP & DuPont  
2011 to 2013+ 
At least 17 patents relating to the use of genetically 
modified yeast and enzymes to produce isobutanol, 
which has a higher energy content than ethanol, 
which can be blended to higher percentage than 
ethanol without vehicle conversion and which can 
be used as a feedstock for jet fuel and a range of 
chemicals. 
Novozymes vs CTE 
Global: resolved in 
favour of Novozymes 
Novozymes is a Danish biopharmaceutical firm; 
CTE Global is an Illinois-based enzyme distributor 2011-2012 
A glucoamylase enzyme with higher thermal 
stability than prior glucoamylases. The patents also 
claim starch conversion processes using the 
enzyme. Glucoamylases are used to convert 
hydrolyzed corn starch to glucose, particularly in 
production of ethanol. 
Novozymes vs Danisco: 
resolved in favour of 
Novozymes 
Danisco was acquired by DuPont in 2011. It is a 
Danish speciality food ingredients company, with 
Genencor as a division specialising in industrial 
biotechnology and enzymes 
2010-2011 
Variants of alpha amylases that exhibit altered 
stability under high temperatures, low pH and other 
conditions. The patented variants can be used for 
starch conversion in ethanol production. 
Neste Oil, vs Dynamic 
Fuels, Syntroleum & 
Tyson Foods: on-going as 
of early 2013 
Neste Oil is a vehicle fuel producer, 50.1% owned 
by the Finnish state. Dynamic Fuels is a joint-
venture of Tyson Foods, Inc., and Syntroleum 
Corporation, producing fuels from animal fats, 
greases and vegetable oils. Tyson Foods is one of 
the world's largest processors and marketers of 
chicken, beef, pork and prepared foods. Syntroleum 
is a small (but substantially capitalised) specialist in 
2nd and 3rd generation biofuel technologies. 
2012-2013+ A process by which diesel fuels are made from animal, plant, or fish fatty acids. 
Sources: Lane (2013) and Fischer (2012). 
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potential for the concentration of knowledge and hence 
market power also applies in developed nations: in the US 
biofuel sector, while patent ownership in the emerging 
biofuel sector is not yet as concentrated as in the agricultural 
biotechnology sector, such concentration is taking place 
nonetheless [78]. 
 Juma and Bell [75] posit three IPR scenarios in relation 
to wider (particularly developing country) access to biofuel 
technology and a number of mechanisms by which control 
over knowledge may be exerted. First is use of company and 
patent acquisition. For example, although small start-up 
companies in the agrobiotech sector still figure prominently 
as acquisition targets or as licensors to the large 
corporations, by 2002, 95% of patents originally held by 
seed or small agrobiotech firms had been acquired by large 
chemical or multinational corporations [75, 81]. When a few 
multinational companies are backed by a broad portfolio of 
patents, including proprietary entitlements on key enabling 
technologies, this may impede access to technologies if they 
refuse to license [75, 81]. 
 Secondly, highly restricted access could occur if many 
different patented technologies (for agricultural and 
industrial processes) are required for producing second 
generation biofuels. Generically this has been referred to as 
the “tragedy of the anti-commons”, which as a concept 
pertains to when multiple owners each have a right to 
exclude others from a scarce resource and no one actor has 
an effective privilege of use [53]. 
 A third mechanism for control of knowledge and hence 
market power may be the use of “blocking” or “hold-up”, in 
which patent holders are unwilling to license their 
technologies for strategic reasons: broad patents may be filed 
or purchased not for the purposes of product development, 
but to enable strategic use of the patents to prevent 
competitors from developing products. Patent lock-up may 
already be taking place, for example, with regard to critical 
enzymes in the biofuels production process [65]. Patenting of 
genetic material and reproduction methods is another 
possible route to controlling access to the best yields. For 
example, most of the 21 patent applications with the species 
‘Jatropha Curcas’ in the title, listed in the European Patent 
Office register at the time of writing, relate to genetic aspects 
of the plant. While several applications were made by Indian 
companies, most of these are listed as having been 
withdrawn, something that merits further investigation. 
3.9. Implications for Future Research, Theory and 
Practice 
 We began this study with the controversial hypothesis 
that IPR law may be hindering - and may come to hinder - 
progress lower carbon energy systems. We further 
hypothesized that this may be mediated by the differing 
market power of smaller and larger firms. We sought to 
explore these ideas in the context of bioenergy and related 
biotechnology, reflecting our own research interests in these 
fields and also entrepreneurship and sustainability. 
 We found that we could neither refute nor substantiate 
our hypotheses: we found no systematic studies of relevance 
that might function as secondary data sources and also that 
collection of relevant primary data is inherently challenging. 
Publicly available patent databases do not readily reveal the 
relationship of patent ownership, use and non-use over time, 
something that also became evident through discussion with 
specialist patent analysts. This is why the PatVal-EU study 
[11] relied on a company questionnaire survey as its 
investigative instrument. It may be that qualitative case-
studies that build on information from such surveys are all 
that are possible. This option would entail following up 
IPR/patent cases inferred from the combination of similar 
survey data and knowledge of a particular firm’s sector and 
particular activity. The obvious problem with such a research 
strategy is that it relies heavily on the open co-operation of 
firms, something that may be compromised in a context in 
which information is typically of substantial commercial 
significance. 
 Practically, we would suggest that there are sufficient 
grounds to warrant at least a light monitoring of the situation 
by informed observers, preferably supported by research as 
described above. In terms of theoretical development, we 
would emphasise the need to acknowledge that an increase in 
private value through IPR development or acquisition need 
not lead to an increase in the public good. The concept of 
shared value generation [83], in which companies seek to 
prosper through meeting social needs, needs to be seen in a 
qualified light (e.g. who gets to define those needs and how 
best to meet them?). Given the instance of at least one public 
body taking pre-emptive action to protect the public good 
from private patent acquisition in the bio-medical sector 
[84], it is clear that realizing shared value in practice will 
require more than gentle exhortation. 
CONCLUSION 
 IPR, centring on patenting, shapes the world by 
controlling access to technology. We know from previous, 
empirical survey work that a substantial percentage of 
patents are deliberately withheld from use for a variety of 
reasons. We have shown how this generates private but not 
social value. Current and future challenges in the global 
economy require a better understanding of the roles and 
inter-relationships of both SMEs and MNCs in this value 
creation process. We have viewed the relationship between 
larger and smaller firms in relation to patenting in terms of 
Schumpeter’s concepts of creative destruction and creative 
accumulation, concepts that are both multidimensional and 
non-exclusive [41]. To date, however, aside from [41] there 
has been little work on conceptualising the link between 
MNCs and SMEs, innovation and the foregoing 
Schumpeterian logic and also little empirical work on the 
role of patent strategy in clean energy technology transfer. 
Issues of commercial confidentiality are likely to be 
unhelpful in this regard. This paper is intended as a small 
contribution to addressing the gap in the extant literature. In 
describing the way in which MNCs may frustrate or thwart 
the process of creative destruction by entrepreneurial market 
entrants, we affirm Schumpeter’s awareness of the capacity 
for market power to stymie innovation, while also 
acknowledging that there are advantages to the large-firm 
routinization of innovation [85]. The biofuel sector serves as 
an example of a new energy sector in which patenting 
activity is relatively high [65] but in which the potential for 
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societal benefits are uncertain for many reasons, IPR being 
one of these. 
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